Introduction
U.N. reform is an ongoing policy issue for the United States, and may be a point of focus during the 110 th Congress. As the single largest financial contributor to the U.N. system, the U.S. government has an interest in ensuring the United Nations operates as efficiently and effectively as possible. In 2005, the United States was assessed 22% (approximately $439.6 million) of the U.N. regular budget, and $1.2 billion to U.N. peacekeeping accounts. Congress has the responsibility to appropriate U.S. funds to these accounts, and can impose conditions on payments. On several occasions, Congress has sought to link U.S. funding of the United Nations to specific reform benchmarks.
In recent years, there has been growing concern among some in the international community that the United Nations has become ineffective and unwieldy in the face of increasing global challenges and responsibilities. In response to these concerns, then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and some U.N. member states proposed a series of management, programmatic, and structural reforms to improve the organization. Many of these reforms are in various stages of implementation, while others are still being considered by member states. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who assumed the position of Secretary-General in January 2007, has indicated that he will continue to support U.N. reform efforts.
This report focuses on current U.N. reform efforts and priorities from the perspective of several key actors, including the U.S. government, the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, selected groups of member states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and a cross-section of groups tasked with addressing U.N. reform. It also examines congressional actions related to U.N. reform, as well as future policy considerations.
Background Reform Trends
Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, U.N. member states and past secretaries-general have repeatedly attempted to reform the organization. These reform efforts tend to be cyclical, with member states considering waves of new reform proposals every five to ten years. The reform attempts can be initiated by a member state, groups of member states, and/or the current secretary-general. They generally focus on three areas of concern: (1) perceived inefficiencies and lack of accountability in the U.N. Secretariat; (2) duplication and redundancy of U.N. 4 In response to the proposals in Boutrous-Ghali's reports, the General Assembly created five open-ended working groups to consider reforms in specific areas, including peace, development, the Security Council, the U.N. financial situation, and strengthening the U.N. system. Only one working group completed its work (the Working Group on Development), and three stopped meeting due to an inability to reach agreement on key issues. The fifth Security Council Working Group still meets regularly. For more information on this working group, see "The Mechanics of Implementing Reform" section of this report.
mandates, missions, and/or programs; and (3) evidence of fraud, waste, abuse and/or mismanagement of U.N. resources.
Proposed reforms often reflect the political, economic, and cultural climate of the time. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, member states focused on increasing membership on the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to account for growing U.N. membership. 1 In the 1970s, as the economic and political gap between developed and developing countries grew more pronounced, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to appoint a group of experts to recommend structural changes that would help the United Nations address "problems of international economic co-operation."
2 The most recent wave of U.N. reform may be driven by a combination of U.N. budgetary and financial issues, controversy over mismanagement of the Iraq Oil-For-Food Program, perceived ineffectiveness of U.N. human rights mechanisms, and recent allegations of sexual abuse committed by U.N. staff and peacekeepers, among other things.
Reform Efforts (1980s and early 1990s)
U.N. reform initiatives in the 1980s and early 1990s focused primarily on financial and structural issues. In 1986, under pressure from the United States and other industrialized countries, the General Assembly established a high-level group of 18 intergovernmental experts to "review the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning," of the United Nations. The group made 71 recommendations to the General Assembly, including a revised budgetary process that introduced the use of consensus-based budgeting. 3 In the early 1990s, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced broad reform proposals in reports, "An Agenda for Peace," (1992) and "An Agenda for Development" (1994) . 4 Some of these reform CRS-3 5 Notably, in 1994 the General Assembly established the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to enhance and improve oversight in the United Nations. 6 Annan appointed a special panel on U.N. Peace Operations in March 2000 to make recommendations for improving the peacekeeping system. The panel's recommendations were consolidated into what is known as the "Brahimi Report." A number of the report's recommendations, such as increasing the number of staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, were implemented. Other recommendations, particularly those involving U.N. member state personnel commitments for deployment, have yet to be achieved. initiatives proposed in the early 1990s led to substantive changes to the U.N. structure.
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Reform Efforts (1997 to 2005)
Kofi Annan ran for Secretary-General on a platform of reform and introduced many reform proposals during his tenure, most notably in 1997, 2002, and 2005 . Annan also appointed several independent panels and commissions to propose reforms on specific issues, such as the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
6 Annan first proposed a "two track" reform program that recommended cutting Secretariat administrative costs, combining three smaller departments into one large Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), and creating the post of Deputy Secretary-General. 7 Over time, some of these early reform initiatives were achieved. 8 In September 2002, Annan proposed additional reforms, including a reorganization of the budget and planning system to make it less complex; a thorough review of the U.N. work program; establishing a high-level panel to examine the relationship between the United Nations and civil society; improving U.N. human rights protection; and enhancing U.N. information services. Nations system and its operational activities." 20 Accordingly, in February 2006, the Secretary-General announced the creation of a High-Level Panel to examine how the U.N. system can work more effectively, especially in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, and the environment. 21 The Panel's final report emphasized the overall value and progress of the United Nations, but also noted that without substantial reforms the United Nations will be "unable to deliver on its promises and maintain its legitimate position at the heart of the multilateral system."
22
The Panel recommended the concept of "One U.N.," to promote greater coherence and consolidation of U.N. departments and agencies at the country, regional, and headquarters level, and also recommended an overhaul of U.N. business practices to bring greater focus on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
23 On December 8, 2006, the United Nations announced that it would test a One U.N. pilot program in Vietnam with an aim of ensuring "faster and more effective development."
24 Secretary-General Ban supports the findings of the Panel, emphasizing his "intention to keep implementing those proposals that build on existing inter-governmental processes and reform initiatives."
25
Overhaul of Internal Justice System. On April 4, 2007, the General Assembly adopted a framework resolution to create a new system of internal justice administration. 26 The system, which should be functional by January 2009, will be part of the Secretariat and coordinated through a new Office of the Administration of Justice that will operate in two tiers -the U.N. Dispute Tribunal and the U.N.
CRS-7
27 These tribunals replace the Joint Disciplinary Committee and Joint Appeals Board. The current internal justice system was established in the late 1940s and was designed to administer internal justice for only several thousand employees in very few locations. 28 Resolution A/RES/61/261 also abolishes the Panels on Discrimination and Other Grievances, and transfers responsibility to the U.N. Office of the Ombudsman. The office will "encourage staff to seek resolution through the informal system," and will also house a Mediation Division to provide mediation services for the staff in the Secretariat and in U.N. funds and programs. 30 The working group's status report on Phase I of mandate review is available at [http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/Status+Report_Nov.+27.pdf]. 31 The first mandates to be considered in this phase are those addressing drug control, crime prevention, and combating international terrorism. 32 For further details on the mandate review process, see "Update on Mandate Review: New Way Forward Discussed in General Assembly," available at [http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php/eupdate/3591].
Appeals Tribunal. 27 The resolution establishes formal and informal channels to protect U.N. staff facing disciplinary action, and provides additional accountability among staff, especially managers. 28 The current internal justice system is criticized by member states for being "slow, cumbersome, ineffective, and lacking in professionalism." 29 The system is backlogged with cases and many of its employees lack formal legal training or qualifications.
Mandate Review. The Outcome Document negotiated by member states at the 2005 U.N. World Summit called for a systematic review of all U.N. mandates five years or older, a process that has never before been undertaken. Member states are currently reviewing mandates in the Working Group of the Plenary on Secretariat and Management Reform, but progress is slow due to resistance from some countries that fear that mandates important to them will be discarded. If the working group recommends a mandate for removal, the General Assembly would need to amend the resolution that established the mandate. In November 2006, the first phase of mandate review, which examined all mandates five years or older that have not been renewed, was completed. The working group's report designated 74 mandates as completed and referred discussions on the Regular Programme for Technical Cooperation (RPTC) mandate to other relevant bodies for further evaluation and analysis. 30 The second phase of review is currently underway and focuses on mandates five years or older that have been renewed. 31 Currently, mandate review has stalled because of member state disagreements regarding its scope and parameters. At the conclusion of the 61 st General Assembly session in September 2007, member states agreed to move forward with mandate review, but did not specify how the review process would be conducted. 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and U.N. Reform
On December 14, 2006, Ban Ki-moon of South Korea took the oath of office to succeed outgoing U.N. Secretary-General Annan. 33 Ban stated that U.N. reform is "the most pressing and principled issue of today," and that it will be a top priority during his tenure. 34 Ban has indicated that his overall reform priorities will include consolidation and better coordination in the U.N. system, improving morale, accountability, and professionalism for U.N. staff, and restoring trust in the United Nations. 42 Secretary-General Ban has repeatedly stressed the importance of financial disclosure, stating on his website that public disclosure is "an important voluntary initiative," that "demonstrates that U.N. staff members understand the importance of the general public and U.N. Member States being assured that... staff members will not be influenced by any consideration associated with his/her private interests." The U.N. 41 A significant point of contention among some member states during negotiations was the level of autonomy the Secretary-General would have to organize the Secretariat vis-á-vis the Assembly's authority to determine the budget and how it should be spent. Thus, in its initial framework resolution the General Assembly required the Secretary-General to provide comprehensive information on the functions, budgets, and other financial implications of the reorganization.
Other Reform Initiatives. Secretary-General Ban has raised other aspects of U.N. reform, including:
! Financial Disclosure -Ban submitted his mandatory personal financial disclosure form and released it to the public. He encourages other U.N. staff to follow his example of public financial disclosure, but will not make it a requirement.
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! Staff Mobility -Ban announced the availability of several Secretariat positions to be filled by internal U.N. staff. He encouraged other managers to do the same, noting the importance of staff mobility among U.N. agencies and departments. 
Congress and U.N. Reform
Generally, Congress supports the United Nations and its mission. It authorizes and appropriates U.S. funds to the organization each year, and often utilizes U.N. mechanisms to further U.S. foreign policy objectives.
44 Congress can also be critical of the United Nations, however, especially when some Members believe that the organization may not be running as effectively as it could be. When this happens, Congress may use a wide range of legislative tools to influence and direct U.S. policy at the United Nations. Such efforts may include considering "sense of the Congress" resolutions; holding hearings to investigate U.N. programs or oversee Administration policies; and determining U.S. nominees for U.N. posts. Placing financial conditions or limits on U.S. funding to the United Nations is another common congressional policy approach to U.N. reform.
U.S. Funding as a Tool for U.N. Reform
Overview and Options. In the past, Congress has used its authority to limit U.S. funds to the United Nations as a mechanism for influencing U.N. policy. 45 In some cases, Congress withheld a proportionate share of funding for U.N. programs and policies of which it did not approve. Since 1980, it has withheld funds from regular budget programs, including the U.N. Special Unit on Palestinian Rights (for projects involving the Palestine Liberation Organization), and the Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea.
The overall impact of withholding a proportionate share of assessed payments depends on the origin of the program's funding. If a program is funded by the U.N. regular budget and the United States withholds a proportionate share of its normal contributions, the cost of the program will most likely be covered by surplus regular budget funds. Some U.N. programs are funded from several budgets that may 48 Additionally, some observers contend that if the United States were to delay or stop payment of its arrears, it may risk losing its vote in the General Assembly -a generally undesirable outcome for many Members of Congress and the Administration. In 1999, for example, the United States came very close to losing its General Assembly vote. Under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, a U.N. member state with arrears equaling or exceeding the member states's assessments for the two preceding years will have no vote in the General Assembly. include the U.N. regular budget, specialized agency budgets, and separate conference and administrative budgets. Because of this, it could be more difficult for U.S. proportionate withholdings to have a significant impact because the program's funding comes from several sources. In such cases, a U.S. withholding would largely be a symbolic gesture that may not affect the program's operation or funding levels. If the United States withholds funds from a program funded primarily by member state contributions, however, the impact of a U.S. withdrawal could be greater. Currently, the only proportionate U.S. withholding from the U.N. regular budget is for some activities and programs related to the Palestine Liberation Organization or entities associated with it.
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In addition to withholding a proportionate share of U.S. funding, Congress may consider enacting legislation decreasing or increasing U.S. assessment levels or linking payment of U.S. arrears to policies it favors. In October 1993, for example, Congress directed that the U.S. payments of peacekeeping assessments be capped at 25% (lower than the assessment level set by the United Nations). 47 Congress also used this strategy to further its U.N. reform policies. Enacted legislation such as the Helms-Biden Agreement linked U.S. assessment levels and the payment of U.S. arrears to reform benchmarks (see Appendix A for more information on legislation).
Arguments For and Against Linking U.S. Funding to U.N. Reform.
Opponents of linking U.S. funding to progress on U.N. reform are concerned that doing so may weaken U.S. influence at the United Nations, thereby undercutting its ability to conduct diplomacy and make foreign policy decisions.
48 Some argue that withholding U.S. assessed payments to the United Nations infringes on U.S. treaty obligations and alienates other U.N. member states. Opponents also note that withholding U.S. funds could have an impact on diplomatic relations outside of the U.N. system. Additionally, some contend that U.N. reform legislation proposals may be unrealistic because the scope and depth of reforms required by the legislation cannot be adequately achieved in the proposed time frames. Supporters of linking U.S. funding to specific reforms argue that the United States should use its position as the largest U.N. financial contributor to push for the implementation of policies that lead to comprehensive reform. They note that despite diplomatic and political pressures from many countries, the United Nations has been slow to implement substantive reform. Advocates also argue that some previously implemented reforms, such as the new Human Rights Council, have proved to be ineffective. They believe that tying U.S. funding to U.N. reform may motivate countries to find common ground on divisive issues. They also emphasize that past legislation that threatened to cut off U.S. funding of the United Nations (such as the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment) was effective, and led to substantive changes in U.N. operations and programs.
Possible Instruments for Furthering U.S. Reform Policy
Congress's influence over U.S. funding of the United Nations is a powerful tool for furthering U.S. reform policy at the United Nations. However, there may be other strategies for Congress to consider when advocating its reform agenda. These strategies have been widely used by many past and current Members of Congress and the Administration, and include, but are not limited to: 
Administration Policy and Priorities
The United States generally supports the mission and mandate of the United Nations. It played a key role in establishing the United Nations in 1945, and serves as one of five permanent members of the Security Council. Some Administrations have been critical of the United Nations, however, and have advocated sweeping reform of the organization. Document, the Administration attempted to work with like-minded countries and the U.N. Secretary-General to move a reform agenda forward. Some initiatives supported by the United States, particularly management and oversight reforms, were not approved or considered by the General Assembly. In addition, the Administration expressed its displeasure with the overall effectiveness of some previously implemented reforms. On May 25, 2006, in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton stated that overall reform results, "have not been particularly encouraging," and that there have been "no real notable successes so far." Ambassador Bolton also stated that while the United States does not agree with all of Secretary-General Annan's proposed reforms, it agrees with "his diagnosis of the problem and supports his efforts." 54 The Administration stated that it will continue to advocate its reform agenda, though it does not support mandatory withholding of U.S. payments to the United Nations. 55 It identified several key priorities that it believes will help the United Nations "move towards a goal of strong, effective, and accountable organization."
56
Management, Budget and Secretariat Reform
The Administration views management, budget, and secretariat reform as a top U.S. priority for U.N. reform. It contends that substantive change in the United Nation's management and budget structure, particularly within the Secretariat, may contribute to the implementation of more effective U.N. policies and further reforms. 57 In a statement before the General Assembly in 2005, President Bush said that meaningful reforms "include measures to improve internal oversight, identify cost savings, and ensure that precious resources are used for their intended purpose."
58 President Bush also emphasized the creation of U.N. structures to "ensure financial accountability and administration and organizational efficiency." 59 Specifically, the Administration advocates:
Increased Oversight and Accountability in U.N. Management Structure. This includes enhanced oversight of procurement activities and management in the Secretariat, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as a fully independent Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). 60 The Administration also advocates increasing the authority of the Secretary-General to hire and deploy personnel.
Review of All U.N. Program Mandates and/or Missions. The Administration has pushed hard for a full mandate review, stressing that the United Nations has over 9,000 mandates and/or programs, some of which may be duplicative or obsolete. It maintains that cost savings resulting from identifying and eliminating these programs can be transferred to fund other reforms.
61
Fiscal Discipline. The Administration believes that the United Nations should implement reforms within existing U.N. budget resources, and encourages reallocating funds from programs identified as lower priority to those identified as higher priority. 62 The Administration also generally supports some management reform initiatives that were recently approved by the General Assembly and Secretariat, including the establishment of the U.N. Ethics Office, increase in internal oversight funding; improved whistle-blower protections, and stricter U.N. staff financial disclosure requirements.
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Peacebuilding Commission
The Administration supported the creation of a U.N. Peacebuilding Commission, which was established by concurrent General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on December 20, 2005. 64 The Commission's mandate is to advise and propose "integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in countries emerging from conflict." 
Democracy Initiatives
The Administration identified democracy promotion -particularly the U.N. Democracy Fund (UNDEF) -as a U.S. priority for U.N. reform. On September 21, 2004, President Bush proposed the establishment of UNDEF to provide resources and assistance for projects that promote emerging democracies. The Fund accepts voluntary funding from U.N. member states and promotes activities related to democratic governance, rule of law, electoral assistance, and anti-corruption in new democracies. 67 In 2005 with the Council's focus on Israel, as well as its inability to address human rights situations in countries such as Cuba, Burma, or North Korea.
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Convention on Terrorism
The 
Development
The Administration identifies economic development as a U.N. reform priority, and aims to build "healthy institutions and strong economies through trade, foreign investment, and aid,"with a focus on "supporting good governance and sound economic policies."
74 At the 2005 U.N. World Summit in New York, the United States joined other member states in agreeing to a $50 billion a year increase in funding (until 2010) to combat poverty, and supported assistance for anti-malaria initiatives, education, and healthcare. The Administration also reaffirmed its commitment to achieving the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.
Security Council Reform
One of the most discussed issues in the U.N. reform debate is the possibility of modifying the composition and size of the Security Council so that it more adequately reflects present-day political and economic realities. The Administration is generally open to Security Council reform but stresses that the Council should be changed only if it will increase the Council's overall effectiveness. 75 Additionally, it supports Japan as a permanent Security Council member given its democratic and human rights record, and its role as the second largest contributor to the United Nations. 76 The Administration believes that developing countries deserve increased representation in the Council, and maintains that any new potential permanent members should meet specific criteria, including the "size of economy and population; military capacity; contributions to peacekeeping operations; commitment to democracy and human rights; financial contributions to the United Nations; nonproliferation and counter-terrorism records; and equitable geographic balance."
77 The Administration states it will remain engaged in the Security Council reform debate, and will continue to be an active participant in the U.N. Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. It has not supported any of the Security Council reform proposals that were submitted for consideration by U.N. member states or former SecretaryGeneral Annan.
Reform Perspectives and Priorities
A significant challenge for advocates of U.N. reform is finding common ground among the disparate definitions of reform held by various stakeholders. The global community has no common definition of U.N. reform and, as a result, there is often debate among some over the scope, appropriateness, and effectiveness of past and current reform initiatives. One method for determining how a stakeholder defines "U.N. reform" may be to identify policy priorities in the U.N. reform debate. In some cases, common objectives among stakeholders have translated into substantive reform policy, though shared goals do not always guarantee successful outcomes.
Recent reform debates in the U.N. General Assembly and its committees drew attention to fundamental differences that exist among some member states, particularly developing countries (represented primarily by the Group of 77 and China), and developed countries (including the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom). Developed countries, which account for the majority of assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget, would like the Secretary-General to have greater flexibility and authority to implement reforms, specifically those related to oversight and human resources. Developing countries, however, generally object to policies that may enhance the power of the Secretary-General and decrease the power of the General Assembly and its budget and administrative committees. Observers are concerned that this difference in reform philosophy will create a deadlock in the General Assembly and significantly delay the implementation of some key management and budget reforms.
CRS-19
78 The groups of U.N. member states discussed in this report are only a few of many political and geographical alliances in the United Nations. Others include the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the African Union. Israel is a temporary member of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), but it is excluded from the system of regional groups outside of U.N. Headquarters in New York. The United States is not a member of any regional group but participates in WEOG as an observer and is "considered part of that group for the electoral purposes." For more information, see Chapter 3, "Groups and Blocs," 
Selected International Perspectives
Stakeholders engaged in the U.N. reform debate have different perspectives on how U.N. reform should be implemented and how to prioritize specific U.N. reform issues.
78 Several key actors, including the European Union, the Group of 77 and China, developed countries, and non-governmental organizations, have weighed in on several reform issues, most notably management and budget reform and development.
European Union (EU).
The EU is composed of 25 countries, accounting for 13% of the vote share in the U.N. General Assembly and approximately 38% of the U.N. regular budget.
79 The EU's reform initiatives often focus on management reform and increasing the U.N. capacity for development. The EU "attaches great importance to keeping U.N. management reform on track," and "vigorously supports "management reforms such as mandate review. 80 It also views the work of the Secretary-General-appointed Panel on System-Wide Coherence as a high priority, and supports the Panel's efforts to explore how the U.N. system may improve system coordination in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance, and the environment. The EU actively supports the reform of core U.N. organs, including the Security Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC, 81 and it also attaches particular importance to the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. membership, which can be a significant voting bloc in the General Assembly. The G-77 generally supports U.N. reform and has long viewed development as a key U.N. reform issue, emphasizing that it should be given the "utmost priority by the United Nations."
84 The G-77 views reform as a process to examine how the mandates of the United Nations can work through "well-coordinated synergies to achieve the Millennium Development Goals." It believes that U.N. reform should not alter the "intergovernmental nature of our [the United Nations] decision-making, oversight, and monitoring process." Additionally, the G-77 does not view reform as a mechanism to "reduce budget levels ... to fund more activities from within the existing pool of resources, nor to redefine the roles and responsibilities assigned to the various organs."
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The G-77 supported some management reforms adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, including the establishment of an ethics office and whistle-blower protection policy. It has, however, actively opposed other initiatives proposed by the Secretary-General, particularly those proposals that it feels may weaken the authority of the General Assembly in the areas of management, budget, and oversight.
86 The G-77 also maintains that the positions of all member countries should be taken into consideration during the reform process. The G-77 has also expressed concern that reform initiatives proposed by the Secretary-General may be influenced by the larger U.N. financial contributors, such as the United States, Japan, and some members of the European Union.
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Developed Countries. In some cases, the reform priorities of developed countries may not always align with the reform priorities of the G-77 and other developing countries. While the G-77 views development as a top U.N. reform priority, many developed countries tend to focus on management, budget, and structural reform. Generally, developed countries make significantly larger financial contributions to the U.N. system than developing country member states and therefore may want to ensure that their funds are used in what they perceive as the most effective way. For example, the United States and the EU, which together accounted for over 50% of the U.N. regular budget in 2005, view management and budget reform as a top priority. Japan, which contributed approximately 19% of the U.N. regular budget in 2005, also views management reform as a priority, CRS-21 88 The foremost institutional reform priority for Japan is changing the composition of the Security Council to "reflect the realities of the international community in the 21 st Century." For more information on Japanese U.N. reform priorities, see the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication, "Japan's Efforts for Reform of the U.N.," available at [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/pamph0608.pdf]. specifically noting the importance of Secretariat reform, Security Council reform, and system-wide coherence.
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The differing perspectives on U.N. reform among developing and developed nations were highlighted in December 2005 when a group of U.N. member states, led primarily by developed countries such as the United States and Japan, sought to link progress on management reforms to the U.N. budget. The countries placed a spending cap of $950 million (about six months of U.N. spending) on the two-year $3.6 billion budget in hopes that the General Assembly would adopt a series of management and budget reform measures proposed by Secretary-General Annan.
89
On May 8, 2006, the General Assembly's Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) bypassed the traditional practice of budget-by-consensus and voted on a resolution, supported by the G-77, that approved some reforms but delayed the consideration of several others. The developed nations that imposed the budget cap were disappointed with the outcome, and eventually lifted the budget cap in June 2006 because they were unwilling to cause a shutdown of the United Nations.
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Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Generally, many NGOs believe that the United Nations needs reform, though they may differ on the best way to achieve this goal. NGO interest in a specific U.N. reform issue is largely dependent on the mission and purpose of the organization. One U.N. reform issue that has captured the attention of some NGOs is the improvement of U.N. human rights mechanisms. The majority of human rights organizations generally supported the creation of a new U.N. Human Rights Council to replace the discredited U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Many believed that the Council was an improvement over the Commission because its structure made it more difficult for countries with poor human rights records to be elected as members. Since the Council began its work in September of 2006, however, some NGOs have been concerned that it has paid too much attention to alleged Israeli human right abuses in Lebanon and in the Occupied Arab Territories. threat to withhold U.N. funding in response to G-77 opposition, which "may have harmful and potentially irreparable effects on our shared goal of improving the United Nations."
91 Other NGOs expressed dissatisfaction with ongoing reform efforts and the work of the United Nations in general. Some believe that the current reform attempts do not go far enough to improve the organization.
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Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups
Since the United Nations was established in 1945, many commissions, panels, committees, and task forces (hereafter referred to collectively as "groups") have been created to examine ways to improve the United Nations.
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These groups are established by a variety of stakeholders, including past secretaries-general, individual member states, groups of member states, NGOs, academic institutions, and others. The following paragraphs will address the findings of a cross-section of these groups -the Volcker Commission, the U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force, and Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security, and Human Rights for All.
Though the circumstances and mandates for each group are different, they made similar recommendations for improving the United Nations. Notably, each group highlighted the need for enhanced internal oversight and Secretariat reform, including staff buyouts and enhanced financial disclosure requirements. The groups also emphasized the need for overall streamlining and consolidation of the U.N. system (see Appendix B for a side-by-side comparison of the recommendations).
The Volcker Commission. In April 2004, Secretary-General Annan, with the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council, appointed an independent high-level commission to inquire into corruption in the U.N.-led Iraq Oil-for-Food Program.
